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As noted previously, this entails the adoption of the strategy that is most common within the interaction range of the player, regardless of the expected payoff .

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As we have reported in, when conformity is assigned randomly and to a sufficiently high fraction of the population, the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced, and the level of cooperation in the stationary state is higher than in the absence of conformist players. 1 show, however, that this effect can be either enhanced or destroyed based on the preference of who will be made to conform.We consider evolutionary social dilemmas on either the scale-free or the Erdős-Rényi random network (see Methods for details), or on interaction networks with a uniform degree distributions, such as the random regular graph and the square lattice, where each player x is initially designated either as cooperator (C) or defector (D) with equal probability.Each instance of the game involves a pairwise interaction where mutual cooperation yields the reward R, mutual defection leads to punishment P, and the mixed choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S and the defector the temptation T.Specifically, if conformists are players with a high degree or high collective influence in the network, the evolution of cooperation is significantly impaired.The constructive interplay between heterogeneity and coordination is almost completely lost.

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